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HAYES v. STATE
any allegation of seisin in an ancestor to within fifty years
in a possessory action, and to within sixty years in a droi-
tural action. 3
However, this statute applied only to the old real
actions, and when ejectment took their place, the Statute
of 21 James I, c. 16 (1623), was enacted to preclude, or
limit, the right of entry, and thus the action of ejectment,
to within twenty years of the accrual of the right or title
in controversy. Therefore, under this statute, a possession
maintained adversely and continuously for twenty years
becomes a source of title paramount in ejectment to any
title derived from an older possession, grant, or patent.24
The Statute of 21 James I, c. 16, being Maryland law
by virtue of Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights," our courts should take cognizance of its existence
for the sake of accurate jurisprudence and not continue to
confuse title by adverse possession with the somewhat
similar doctrine of prescription.
DENE L. LusBY
Unloaded Pistol As A Dangerous Weapon Within
The Robbery Statute
Hayes v. State'
Defendant was indicted for attempted robbery with a
dangerous and deadly weapon. After trial before the court
sitting without a jury, he was found guilty and sentenced
to twenty years in the Maryland Penitentiary. On appeal,
he contended that the verdict was erroneous because the
evidence clearly showed that the pistol used in the robbery
attempt was unloaded, and therefore not a dangerous and
deadly weapon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convic-
tion, holding that the unloaded gun was "dangerous" under
the robbery statute and that it was not necessary to con-
sider the question of "deadly", for the conditions were in
the alternative.
Ibid, 138.
'Ibid. The Statute of 21 James I, c. 16, 2 ALEx. BRIT. STAT. (2d ed. 1912)
599, however, did not bar real action by writ of right which ran for an addi-
tional forty years. (This problem did not arise in Maryland, however, as
the writ of right was not a recognized form of action.) To rectify this
si'tuation in England, the Statute of 3 and 4 William I, c. 27 (1833),
stipulated the extinguishment of the former title after twenty years. The
Statute of 37 and 38 Victoria, c. 57, popularly known as the Real Property
Limitation Act of 1874, reduced the period of limitation to twelve years.
2 ALex. BRIT. STAT. (2d ed. 1912) 599-628.
1 211 Md. 111, 126 A. 2d 576 (1956).
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In so holding an unloaded pistol to be a dangerous
weapon within the meaning of the robbery statute,' the
Court of Appeals aligned itself with the overwhelming posi-
tion in this country. Casewise, only the state of Wisconsin
is opposed to this view;3 and the legislature of that State
amended its robbery statute to bring the rule there in line
with the rest of the United States. A later amendment,
however, may have restored the minority rule of the Wis-
consin cases.4
2 MD. CODE (1951) Art. 27, Sec. 574A. "Every person convicted of the
crime of robbery or attempt to rob with a dangerous or deadly weapon...
shall . . . be sentenced to imprisonment in the Maryland Penitenitary (sic)
for not more than twenty years."
8 Lipscomb v. State, 130 Wis. 238, 109 N. W. 986 (1906) ; Schiner v. State,
178 Wis. 83, 189 N. W. 261, 262 (1922) ; Luitze v. State, 204 Wis. 78, 234
N. W. 382, 74 A. L. R. 1202 (1931).
' The original amendment, which the Court of Appeals cited in the
subject case is found in Wis. STAT. (1953), Title XXXII, Sec. 340.39:
"Assault and theft, being armed. Any person who shall assault
another and shall feloniously rob . . . such robber being armed with a
dangerous weapon, or any firearm, loaded or unloaded, with intent, if
resisted, to kill or maim the person robbed, and being so armed, who
shall wound or strike the person robbed, shall be punished by imprison-
ment ... not less than 3 years nor more than 30 years."
However, a Wisconsin statute, Chapter 623, Laws of 1953, was enacted to
revise Title XXXII ". . . for the purpose of enacting a new criminal code."
Section 343.28 of this new code read:
"Aggravated Robbery. Whoever intentionally commits robbery under
either of the following aggravating circumstances may be imprisoned
not more than 30 years:
(1) The actor commits robbery while armed with a dangerous
weapon; or
(2) the actor, in committing the robbery, accidentally or other-
wise causes death or great 'bodily harm to the owner or another
who is present."
The above section was designed to replace Title XXXII, Sec. 340.39 of
the 1953 Code. Although the proposed Code never went into effect, a pro-
vision substantially similar for present purposes to Section 343.28 was
adopted in the new Wisconsin criminal code. LAWS OF WIS. 1955 c. 696
repealed the old criminal code and the present provision, Wis. STAT. (1955),
TITLE XLV, See. 943.32, which repealed the old Sec. 340.39, reads:
"943.32. Robbery. (1) Whoever, with intent to steal, takes property
from the person or presence of the owner by either of the following
means may be imprisoned not more than 10 years:...
(2) Whoever violates sub. (1) while armed with a dangerous weapon
may be imprisoned not more than 30 years .... "
Thus, in both the proposed revision of the criminal code and in the
current code, the words referring to "firearms, loaded or unloaded" have
been completely omitted. This would seem to present ample basis for the
contention that an unloaded pistol may not be a dangerous weapon in Wis-
consin. Whether, by rewording the statute, the Wisconsin Legislature
determined to revert to the case law of that State, is a matter that only
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin can determine. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee, infra, n. 26, may have had this legislative history in mind when
in 1956 it treated Lultze v. State, supra, n. 3, as valid Wisconsin authority.
For a discussion of the development of the present Wisconsin criminal
code, see Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. Rev. 350.
HAYES v. STATE
The Court, in the instant case, wisely refused to rule on
the concept "deadly weapon", which might have introduced
confusion unnecessary to its decision. Elsewhere, many
courts accord the same definition to both "dangerous" and
"deadly", while generally admitting that the former term
is included in the latter;' other jurisdictions either confuse
the terms outright or attempt to distinguish them in various
ways, some of which are eminently reasonable and others
wholly unrealistic. 6 The contradictions used in applying
the term "dangerous" are likewise indulged in when dis-
cussing "deadly", and there seems to be a high degree of
overlap.7 Still further distinctions are attempted according
to whether the courts seek to apply the terms to robbery,
assault or concealed weapons statutes.8 Beyond thus ob-
serving the possible confusion in use of the two terms, this
note deals only with the term "dangerous weapon" as
applied to the crime of robbery with a dangerous weapon.
In Lipscomb v. State,' the leading case for the over-
whelmed minority jurisdiction of Wisconsin, the Supreme
Court of that state said:
"It is an essential element of the crime of which the
defendant was convicted that he be armed with a dan-
gerous weapon. An empty revolver merely pointed at
a person and not used to strike with, is not a dangerous
weapon, however much the person at whom it is
pointed may be put in fear."1
On the surface, this statement would seem quite sound, for
if the revolver was utterly incapable of being fired at that
time, and there was no threat, either real or apparent, that
the pistol would have been used as a bludgeon, then it is
difficult to see how it would fall within the most often
quoted definition of a dangerous weapon, i.e., one likely to
produce death or great bodily harm."
a11 WoRDs & PHRASES (1940), 79. See also, p. 129.
6 Ibid.
Ibid.
Annotation, 74 A. L. R. 1206. For an excellent compilation of pertinent
material see Warnken, Is An Unloaded Pistol A Dangerous or Deadly
Weapon Within The Robbery Statute of Maryland, Daily Record, Novem-
ber 22, 1954.
9 Supra, n. 3. See also concurring opinion of Finlayson, P. J., in People
v. Seawright, 72 Cal. App. 414, 237 P. 796, 798 (1925), which approves this
view.
10 Supra, n. 3.
11 Bouvima, LAw DICTIONARY (8th Ed., 3rd Rev. 1914) 754-755; BLACK, LAW
DIcrONARY (4th Ed., 1951) 471. See also n. 5, supra. Also adopted by the
Court of Appeals in the principal case, 8upra, n. 1, 114.
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The Court of Appeals, in holding an unloaded pistol to
be a dangerous weapon within the meaning of our robbery
statute, 2 cited a series of California cases,13 based on a
similar statutory provision of that State. 4 In the first of
these, People v. Egan,5 the court said:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that in com-
mitting robbery pistols are frequently used as bludg-
eons rather than as firearms."' 6
But in that case, there was no evidence that the pistol was
attempted or threatened to be used as a bludgeon rather
than as a firearm. Ignoring any question of public policy
involved, and treating the issue as one of fact, this would
seem, at first blush at least, to be a rather cavalier method
of disposing of the contention that such an instrumentality
is not one likely to produce death or great bodily harm.
In People v. Freeman,7 the defendant used a large unloaded
revolver, but no attempt was made either to shoot or to use
it as a bludgeon. The Court said:
"The question as to whether a given instrument
is .. .dangerous ... depends .. .primarily upon the
attendant circumstances, as well as upon the use which
has been made or is proposed to be made, of the par-
ticular instrument."'8
Further:
It.. if, considering the attendant circumstances,
together with the present ability of its possessor, the
instrument is capable of being used in a deadly or dan-
gerous manner, for the purpose of the particular occa-
sion only, the character of the instrument may be
established."'"
Supra, n. 2.
IPeople v. Egan, 77 Cal. App. 279, 246 P. 337 (1926) ; People v. Freeman,
86 Cal. App. 374, 260 P. 826 (1927) ; People v. Ash, 88 Cal. App. 2d 819,
199 P. 2d 711 (1948). Other pertinent cases in this series are People v.
Shaffer, 81 Cal. App. 752, 254 P. 666 (1927); People v. Milburn, 89 Cal.
App. 526, 265 P. 285 (1928) ; People v. Coleman, 53 Cal. App. 2d 18, 127 P.
2d 309 (1942) ; People v. Ward, 84 Cal. App. 2d 357, 190 P. 2d 972 (1948) ;
People v. Raner, 86 Cal. App. 2d 107, 194 P. 2d 37 (1948) ; and People v.
White, 115 Cal. App. 2d 828, 253 P. 2d 108 (1953).
"CCAL. PENAL CoDE (1949), Sec. 211a: "All robbery .. .perpetrated .









The Court then went on to say that although the defendant
was ten or twelve feet away, it was possible within a very
short time to have used the pistol as a bludgeon or club,
thus rendering it a dangerous weapon. This case, citing the
Egan"2 and Shaffer"' cases, held to the highly speculative
realm of "possibility", there being no factual basis, in the
particular case, to justify it. The rationale of this line of
cases seemingly reached its nadir, factually speaking, in
People v. Coleman,2 2 where a toy metallic cap pistol was
held to be a dangerous weapon within the California rob-
bery statute.28 To the same effect was People v. Ward, 4
where, although there was conflicting evidence as to
whether the pistol used in the robbery was a toy, the court
said that even if it were, it would have been a dangerous
weapon, again dredging up the "possibility" rationale, even
though there was no attempt or threat to use the pistol
other than as a firearm.
It might well be wondered where, having thus embarked
into the nebulous realm of possibility, the California courts
would attempt to draw a line as to what would be a dan-
gerous weapon under their robbery statute.2" Suppose a
robbery were attempted with an instrument which, in the
dusk of day, reasonably appeared to the intended victim to
be a pistol, when it was in reality but a piece of black soft
sponge-rubber, attempted to be employed as a pistol, and
not even a bludgeon; or, how about the finger-in-the-
coat-pocket use? Are these to be considered dangerous
weapons?28 Would such a holding justify taking four addi-
tional years of the defendant's freedom," or in Maryland,





84 Cal. App. 2d 357, 190 P. 2d 972 (1948).
CAL. PENAL CODE (1949), Sec. 211a.
An interesting recent case is Cooper v. State, 297 S. W. 2d 75 (Tenn.,
1956), where a toy pistol, appearing genuine, was employed in a robbery.
A recent amendment to the Tennessee robbery statute allowed the death
penalty if the robbery were committed by the use of a deadly weapon.
Defendant was sentenced to thirty years under that amendment. The
Supreme Court of Tennessee, in overruling and remanding the case, refused
to follow the New York doctrine of People v. Hunt, 267 N. Y. 597, 196 N. E.
598 (1935), which, without opinion, held a toy pistol to be a deadly weapon
in such situations. Although admittedly the term "dangerous weapon" was
not used in the statute, the court recognized Luitze v. State, 204 Wis. 78,
234 N. W. 382, 74 A. L. R. 1202 (1931), as still being valid Wisconsin law,
and viewed the Legislative intent as one designed to prevent harm to the
victim rather than intimidation.
Supra, n. 25, Sec. 213.
" MD. CODE (1951), Art. 27, See. 574A.
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and that a sentence for the lesser degree of robbery would
be quite suitable.29
If what the courts are attempting to protect is the harm
which might come to the victim through the use of a dan-
gerous weapon, then clearly there is little justification in
the facts of many of these cases to hold the weapon dan-
gerous. If the courts are attempting to guard the victim
from intimidation, a fact that is quite common in robbery
not involving any weapon, it is submitted that, when bal-
anced against the difference in the prison sentence, an un-
loaded gun which is not attempted to be used as a bludgeon
and which is not reasonably believed by the victim to be
attempted to be so used, is not a dangerous weapon within
the meaning of the statute. This is not to say the felon is
not to be punished to the fullest extent of the law, or that
he should be in any way subsidized for his wrongdoing; it
is merely suggested that the punishment fit the crime, and
that under the circumstances of these cases it does not.
As a further basis for its opinion the Court of Appeals
remarked that:
"The courts passing on the point have sometimes
drawn a distinction between assault with a dangerous
weapon and robbery or attempted robbery with a dan-
gerous weapon. In the latter case, it is almost uni-
formly held that the offense is independent of the
assault and may as well be accomplished by intimida-
tion as by force. Hence, it is held to be immaterial
whether the pistol used to effect the taking or at-
tempted taking is loaded or unloaded.""0
Is it to be inferred that the term "dangerous weapon" when
used in a robbery statute does not mean the same thing as
a dangerous weapon in an assault situation? In the ac-
cepted definition in both types of situations it is almost
universally declared to be a weapon likely to produce death
or great bodily harm or injury, terms which do not seem
susceptible to varying construction.
It should be observed that the majority of jurisdictions
in this country when dealing with cases of assault with a
dangerous weapon,31 apply the opposite approach of looking
at the actual facts in the use of the weapon, as illustrated by
the language of Price v. United States,82 where the court
said:
Ibid, Sec. 573.
Hayes v. State, 211 Md. 111, 114-115, 126 A. 2d 576 (1956).
See Annotation: 74 A. L. R. 1206.
156 F. 950 (9th Cir., 1907).
[VOL. XVII262
TALBERT v. REEVES
"[Ilt is perfectly clear that an unloaded pistol,
when used in the manner shown by the evidence in
this case, is not, in fact, a dangerous weapon. If the
defendant had struck or attempted to strike with it,
the question whether it was or was not a dangerous
weapon in the manner used, or attempted to be used,
would be one of fact; but the courts quite uniformly
hold as a matter of law that an unloaded pistol, when
there is no attempt to use it otherwise than by pointing
it in a threatening manner at another, is not a dan-
gerous weapon."8 3
With the presumption that a firearm so used is loaded,
which is already followed by the great majority of robbery
cases, and even by the Wisconsin cases, as indicated in the
opinion of the principal case,84 it might well be argued that
the approach of the assault cases could be followed in the
robbery cases with more justice than lies in the "possi-
bility" approach above described. There would be greater
consistency obtained in the two lines of cases, which seem
to be dealing with essentially the same problem.
SAMUEL LYLS FnLAND
Removal Of Administrator Because Of
Conflicting Interests
Talbert v. Reeves1
The wife of an intestate, after qualifying as his adminis-
tratrix,2 filed her personal claim against the estate for ser-
vices rendered to the intestate's business for the sixteen
years prior to the decedent's death. The two surviving
sisters of the intestate thereupon filed exceptions demand-
ing due proof of this claim and further alleged that a sub-
stantial portion of this claim was barred by the statute of
limitations.' Counsel for the administratrix made a motion
to strike out these exceptions on the grounds that the de-
fense of limitations was not available to the exceptants,
and that they were not entitled to call for full proof since
that was a matter solely between the court and the adminis-
Ibid, 952.
Supra, n. 30, 115.
1211 Md. 275, 127 A. 2d 533 (1956), di8. op. 283.
'MD. CODE (1951) Art. 93, Sec. 22.
'MD. CoDE (1951) Art. 57, Sec. 1.
19571
